Abstract. The literature on unemployment has mostly focused on labor market issues while the impact of capital formation is largely neglected. Job creation is often thought to be a matter of encouraging more employment on a given capital stock. In contrast, this paper explicitly deals with the long-run consequences of institutional shocks on capital formation and employment. It is shown that the usual tradeoff between employment and wages disappears in the long run. In line with an appropriation model, the estimated values for the long-run elasticities of substitution between capital and labor for Germany and France are substantially greater than one.
INTRODUCTION
The dismal development on continental European labor markets along with the lack of serious efforts to fight unemployment continues to be puzzling. While the US is enjoying the fruits of its longest post-World War II expansion with record low unemployment rates and almost price-level stability, continental Europe and in particular its two flagship countries, France and Germany, seem to be stuck in an inexorable upward trend in unemployment rates. Although this European unemployment phenomenon has been widely discussed in the literature, it remains far from being resolved.
In fact, additional puzzles keep popping up. It has recently been noted that labor shares in Germany and France have been falling almost continuously since the early 1980s after having risen sharply in the wake of the two oil price shocks in the 1970s. 1 Although there is widespread agreement that rising unemployment was largely due to classical reasons, these falling labor shares put classical explanations of rising unemployment based on wages growing faster than productivity into doubt. However, Keynesian explanations, which have recently enjoyed a resurgence in popularity, 2 fare even worse upon closer inspection. The strong growth of capital intensities, capital coefficients, and profit rates are evidence against the importance of high real interest rates and the associated alleged lack of aggregate demand in explaining rising unemployment. Furthermore, the outward shifts of the Beveridge curve and of the Okun curve along with the rise in the NAIRU (NAWRU) 3 over time indicate that demand policy is not the adequate policy instrument for fighting continental European unemployment. 4 This lack of explanatory power of the two standard theories of unemployment has surely contributed to the current fashion of tracing rising unemployment in Europe back to changes in the structure of labor demand. 5 It is argued that globalization and technological progress biased in favor of qualified workers lead to fundamental changes in the structure of labor demand. The service sector grows while the industrial sector shrinks and labor demand of firms concentrates on qualified workers, whereas their need for lowqualified workers declines rapidly. These developments clash head-on with labor market institutions in continental Europe, in particular with generous and, as a rule, unlimited unemployment benefits, a high level of welfare assistance, a close to 100% marginal tax rate when moving from receiving government transfer payments to regular employment, centralized wage negotiations, and strong unions. Hence, the superior performance of the American labor market is, according to this view, essentially due to more flexible wage structures and more mobile workers. However, in spite of the intuitive appeal of this approach some questions remain. It is, for example, somewhat incompatible with this view that unemployment has in fact also risen among qualified workers across OECD countries and that the rate of unemployment among low-qualified workers in the US is very much comparable to the one in continental Europe. Furthermore, it is puzzling in this respect that the rate of vacancies has increased far less than the rate of unemployment in continental Europe. Finally, it is not clear how this approach can explain the strikingly different developments of labor shares between continental Europe and the US.
contrast to the US. 7 Two strands can be distinguished among these papers. Either a combination of a more or less standard labor market model with several shocks is offered, or it is a parsimonious explanation based only on the long-run consequences of a massive institutional shock which strongly raises the potential of labor to appropriate capital. It is a key feature of the latter approach that the possibilities of capital to withdraw from the production process or to substitute capital for labor are much greater in the long run than in the short run. In this paper we will put this latter approach under closer scrutiny. To this end, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the relevant stylized empirical facts. Section 3 presents the structure of the dynamic model and intuitively describes the main predictions of the model. Section 4 checks these predictions empirically; it offers in particular for Germany, France, and the US impulse-response functions concerning wage shocks and estimations of the long-run elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. Section 5 concludes. Figure 1 depicts the well-known fact that standardized unemployment rates have developed quite differently in the large continental European countries Germany, France, Italy, and Spain compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries US and UK since the early 1970s. Unemployment rates in continental Europe, with the exception of the Netherlands, have ratcheted upwards, thus displaying a high degree of persistence if not even hysteresis, whereas the Anglo-Saxon countries show more cyclical variations in their unemployment rates but no upward trend. To the contrary, at least in the US the unemployment rate has followed a downward trend since the early 1980s. Considering that all of these highly developed OECD countries have been hit more or less by the same shocks like the oil price shocks and globalization, 8 these differences must mainly stem from variations in institutions across these countries and/or within countries. The focus of the paper will be to show that not only differences especially in labor market institutions across countries matter, a fact which is almost universally accepted by now, but that changes in institutions within countries over this time period are also crucial for a coherent explanation of unemployment rates and of labor shares.
THE RELEVANT STYLIZED FACTS
This alludes to the next stylized fact, namely that the development of labor shares is also significantly different across these countries (Figure 2 ). Similar to the unemployment rate, the labor shares in the US and the UK display no trend in the long run, but rather mainly cyclical variations. Hence, both of these two countries come somewhat close to having something like a`natural rate' in the long run concerning both the unemployment rate and the labor share. This is 7.
See Blanchard (1998 Blanchard ( , 1999 , Caballero and Hammour (1997 , 1998 ), and Rowthorn (1999 . 8.
The German reunification is of course an exception. not the case in the continental European countries. Especially Germany, France, and Spain display a hump-shaped time path of the labor share with a peak somewhere in the mid-1970s to early 1980s and a strong and almost continuous fall in their respective labor shares since then. The hump-shaped time path of the labor share is not as clearly visible in the cases of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy, but there is also in these three countries a peak in the early 1970s followed by an almost continuous decline without much cyclical variation since then. So, contrary to what standard neoclassical economic theory would suggest based on Cobb±Douglas production functions, there appears to be no constant value for the labor share in continental Europe in the long run. This difference, compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries, calls for an explanation. We therefore choose to compare the most striking cases in our more detailed analysis later on, which are Germany, France, and the US. There is in fact further evidence that simple Cobb±Douglas production functions are not suitable for describing the evolution of unemployment rates and of labor shares since the early 1970s. The implied unit elasticity of substitution between labor and capital appears to be too restrictive. The dynamic response to shocks in particular of the continental European countries is richer than suggested by the Cobb±Douglas assumption. Figure 3 shows the development of the ratios of wages and of the marginal products of labor for Germany, France, and the US based on Cobb±Douglas production functions.
9
Only the US shows a very close relationship between wages and the marginal product of labor, while wage rises in Germany and France substantially exceeded the growth of the marginal product of labor in the 1970s and has fallen short of it since the early 1980s. Obviously, this rough assessment is more evident for France than for Germany.
We take Figure 3 as a benchmark and as an intuitive starting point for our economic analysis.
10 While it is, for Germany and France, in clear conflict with a simple neoclassical approach, according to which wages and the marginal Source: OECD Statistical Compendium (1996) and OECD Economic Outlook (December 1998).
9.
The partial elasticities of production are set equal to their average national values for the time 1970 to 1973 on the premise that countries were essentially in steady states at that time.
10.
See also Berthold et al. (1998) . productivity of labor should track each other closely in all countries at all times, it fits on first sight an alternative set of assumptions. Namely, the picture conveys the impression of a putty±clay production technology in the short run with a very low elasticity of substitution and a technological menu in the long run with a much higher elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. In short, in the 1970s workers in Germany and France managed to achieve wage growth substantially in excess of labor productivity growth, but they have been paying for this afterwards with wage growth falling short of labor productivity growth. This suggests that capital in continental Europe responded to the appropriation push by labor in the 1970s by steadily excluding labor from the production process, thus not only raising the capital intensity of production but also not letting labor fully share the fruits of output growth since then. Hence, the fact that countries at a similar stage of economic development display such different capital intensities might be largely due to political interferences into the functioning of labor markets in continental Europe. The gist of this theory is also backed up by the following cross-country comparison. Figure 4 gives a hint that the asserted hump-shaped time path of the labor share in countries with strongly rising unemployment is not just an artefact for France and Germany. Performing simple OLS between the change of the unemployment rate and the cumulated change of the labor share yields the following result:
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(t-statistics in parentheses). The corresponding regression line is depicted in Figure 4 . Thus it can tentatively be concluded that across OECD countries unemployment rose more where the cumulative changes of the labor share were also large. In order to exclude a U-shaped time path and in order to avoid obtaining the sum of only large cyclical variations in labor shares, the changes in the filtered labor shares were added up from trough to peak and then back to trough. 11 Hence, these two developments, rising unemployment and humpshaped time path of labor shares, may indeed be related. Starting from an essentially very good employment situation in all OECD countries in the early 1970s, unemployment rates have risen most in countries where labor shares increased markedly during the 1970s and have dropped substantially from their top somewhere in the late 1970s to early 1980s. While the 1970s fit well with 
MODELING RISING UNEMPLOYMENT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF APPROPRIATION

The gist of the story
In contrast to the US, many continental European economies witnessed substantial institutional changes in favor of labor in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The transformation of the capital±labor relations in continental Europe in general, but especially in Germany and France during that time period, is well documented and generally recognized. 13 The bargaining power of unions grew substantially during this period. In France and Germany, this is in particular due to the fact that employment protection increased markedly in the late 1960s and early 1970s and has been roughly stable since then. Furthermore, welfare state activities along with active labor market policies expanded. Governments assumed to a much larger degree than before responsibility for the employment situation largely due to overly optimistic expectations about the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies in guaranteeing full employment. Thus, wage setters were systematically exonerated from their responsibility for the situation on the labor market. Unions and employers seized this opportunity by agreeing on wage settlements which mainly served their interests but contributed very little or nothing to preventing or to fighting unemployment. Wage setters externalized the arising costs of unemployment on the rest of society and in particular on future generations.
From a political economy perspective, this institutional response can in hindsight be regarded as an almost natural development considering the excellent economic development in the 1950s and 1960s. Just taking Germany as a leading example, productivity growth exceeded wage growth on an almost regular basis during this catch-up phase, resulting in labor shortages and in a large number of guest workers flowing in. However, the greater potential of labor to appropriate capital came at a very unfortunate time, namely when the oil price shocks and the general slowdown of productivity growth would have required strong and lasting wage restraint. Labor appropriates capital whenever it uses its ex-post bargaining strength for 12 . Lehment (1999) shows empirically for Germany that the falling labor share is not the result of a too moderate wage policy.
13.
See Blanchard (1999) , Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) , Siebert (1997) , and Caballero and Hammour (1997) .
pushing down the ex-post return to capital just above the opt-out margin so that capital does not yet abandon joint production. Capital has then very little incentive to open new joint production units, though. Hence, this approach fits nicely with the often lamented slowdown of capital formation in continental Europe since the mid-1970s. 14 Furthermore, it has the advantage of offering an explanation for the differences between countries in the development of capital formation since that time. Now, the challenging question is how to explain the further rise in unemployment in continental Europe since this time period considering that the institutional build-up in favor of labor in continental Europe came to a halt somewhere around the mid-1970s. Labor market institutions have remained more or less the same since then.
15 Standard theory about employment determination would suggest that these institutional changes in favor of labor resulted in an upward shift of the wage-setting curve in the wage±employment plane. However, the total negative employment effects of such a shift should be borne out after a few years when the intersection point between the new wagesetting curve and the horizontal long-run labor demand curve is reached via a downsizing of the aggregate capital stock relative to trend. The following model is designed to argue that the long-run negative employment effects of increasing the appropriation potential of labor are even larger and take a much longer time to completely materialize than is usually assumed because the full dynamic adjustment in technology and in capital intensity is a protracted process. 
The structure of the dynamic model
The model is a slightly simplified version of Caballero and Hammour (1997). 17 It is intended to capture the dynamic interaction between capital and labor in an institutional environment where there is an increasing potential of labor to appropriate capital. It is assumed that the appropriation problem cannot be precontracted away, i.e. the necessary contracts such as workers giving a deposit to firms before joining firms or credibly committing themselves to working with full effort at a predetermined wage, are not feasible and/or illegal. Such appropriation attempts by insiders are, however, only successful in the short run where the supply of capital is highly inelastic due to a putty±clay production technology of already invested vintages of capital. In contrast, firms face in the long run a technological menu allowing them to choose between very different technologies, which are reflected in varying capital intensities of production. Hence, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is 14.
See Blanchard (1998) and Rowthorn (1999) .
15.
See Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) . 16.
For an early, albeit informal, interpretation of the developments on continental European labor markets in the 1980s along these lines, see Hellwig and Neumann (1987) . 17.
For comparative static variants of this model, see Caballero and Hammour (1998) and Berthold and Fehn (1999) . low only in the short run, but high in the long run. Adjusting the production technology by raising the capital intensity of production can therefore in the long run be a powerful instrument of capital to thwart appropriation attempts of labor. The resulting rise in the aggregate unemployment rate reduces the value of the exit option of insiders and thus also their bargaining strength. The institutional bias in favor of labor is thus in the long run balanced by higher unemployment which serves to guarantee capital its internationally required rate of return, r b 0. This is of course a highly inefficient macroeconomic response to a distorted institutional framework. There are only two factors of production in the model, capital and labor, and one consumption good which is used as the nume Âraire. It is a continuous time model with an infinite horizon. Agents have perfect foresight about aggregate variables and the institutional shock in favor of labor is assumed to be unanticipated.
18 Aggregate capital and employment at time t are Kt and Nt. Aggregate labor supply is assumed to be fully inelastic and normalized to one, whereas uncommitted capital is taken to be fully elastic. Concerning technology, the ex-ante technological menu at time t is given by a CES production function with constant returns to scale and with ' being the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor:
with z, ' b 0, 0``1. k and n represent capital and labor inputs, respectively, in a specific production unit. At is a measure of labor-augmenting technical progress, which takes place at rate 1 b 0:
Once the technology is chosen and the investment is undertaken at time t 0 , the ex-post production function is assumed to be putty±clay. It incorporates a fixed level of technical progress At 0 and a fixed ex-post capital intensity:
Hence, capital is inelastic in the short run where a large part of the total supply of capital is already committed, but highly elastic in the long run. Firms can choose ex ante from the technological menu FkY Atn which constitutes de facto an envelope of available Leontieff production functions with fixed factor proportions. Moving ex post from one specific Leontieff production function to another is, however, not possible instantaneously but rather takes time. Such a move is denoted by a change in t, in which the chosen technology is embodied. As all investors are facing the same conditions at a given point in time, all production units of a specific vintage are identical. A production unit
18. This implies that we assume rational expectations.
created at time t 0 is the combination of one unit of labor and t 0 At 0 units of capital. The structure of production at any given point in time t is characterized by the number of production units of different ages a, denoted by naY t, and the capital intensity of such units t À a, where a can vary between 0 and the maximum age of any unit " at. Aggregate capital stock, employment, and output at time t are obtained by taking the appropriate integrals over all the operational vintages of capital which differ in age and therefore also production technology:
Technical progress causes old production units with obsolete technologies to be continuously replaced by new production units with the latest technology, which is embodied in a larger value of t. Such creative destruction comes via dAadt b 0, and it is either planned or due to surprises. Planned creative destruction takes place after the expected lifetime of a unit Tt has expired. Owing to the perfect foresight assumption, Tt is equal to " at Tt. Unplanned creative destruction happens at the exogenous rate .
The driving force of the results of the model are the assumptions that there exist specific quasi-rents and that due to incomplete contracting factors may appropriate each other. Technological as well as institutional variables can make capital appropriable in the sense that a fraction 0t of the invested capital becomes relationship-specific and is lost if capital separates from labor. Technological appropriability, for example, can arise due to firms financing the training of their workers. While technological causes for appropriability are surely not to be neglected and appear to become more important due to the rising skill requirements of firms, politically induced appropriability problems still seem to prevail in continental European welfare states. Two such important and straightforward factors are firing costs and unemployment benefits. Both government interventions into the functioning of labor markets strengthen the bargaining position of insiders in wage negotiations and thus raise their power to appropriate capital. In what follows, it is assumed that a loss of x f tAt is incurred by firms in case of a separation decision. It is furthermore assumed that workers receive in case of unemployment the fraction x b t of their shadow wagewtAt. The shadow wage is by definition equal to the worker's outside opportunities, which consist of a stock and a flow component. The former is equal to the increase in human wealth once the worker again finds a job and therefore ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 has to be multiplied by the probability of this event, whereas the latter is simply equal to the level of unemployment benefits:
To keep matters as simple as possible, the probability of finding a job is just taken to be gross hiring Ht divided by the aggregate unemployment pool Ut 1 À Nt, out of which hiring only takes place. Hence, it is assumed that all the unemployed have an equal chance of becoming re-employed at time t. is the relative bargaining power of workers vis-a Á -vis firms. Wages are determined by continuous and generalized Nash-bargaining between workers and firms. St are the specific quasi-rents of a production unit that has just been created at time t. St is equal to the value-added in a new production unit, which is given by the first two expressions on the RHS of the following equation (8), minus the outside opportunities, i.e. the shadow wages of capital and labor:
where cit is the unit cost of investment at time t. Actual wage payments are equal to shadow wages plus a quasi-specific rent premium, which depends negatively on the age of a production unit. Hence, some form of implicit profit-sharing takes place in this model. The reasons for this form of rent-sharing in actual wage payments are, inter alia, that firms have to incur firing costs when laying off workers, and that the relationship-specific component of capital 0t is also lost in that case. Yet, such relationshipspecific capital is assumed to be financed mainly by firms because workers often face binding credit constraints. It is furthermore assumed that there are no precontracting possibilities so that the ex-post appropriation problem occurs with full force. Once a worker has been hired, he becomes an insider thus obtaining market power vis-a Á -vis the firm. His terms of trade are better ex post compared to ex ante and being an insider he can no longer be denied the quasi-specific rent component. A production unit is scrapped once the quasi-specific rent premium becomes negative because workers then prefer to abandon the firm and to seek work elsewhere. Their expected income is in such a case equal to the shadow wage.
19.
For a detailed derivation of equations (8) through (11), see the appendix in Caballero and Hammour (1997) . They also provide a detailed simulation of the model for the case of France, but no actual empirical estimation of the long-run elasticity of substitution between labor and capital for any country.
It is assumed that there is free entry of firms in creating new production units, so that the specific investments, which the firm is sinking into the production unit, must be equal to the firm's share of quasi-rents:
Since firms maximize profits, a production unit will be dissolved once its revenues are just equal to the worker's shadow wage minus the benefits of delaying the separation decision. These benefits are possibly twofold, namely the inevitably arising firing costs are borne at a later date and firing costs may in addition be reduced meanwhile. Hence, the exit condition of firms reads as follows:
The size of the shadow wage, not of actual wage payments, is relevant for the firm's decision whether to dissolve a production unit or not, because workers must at least receive the shadow wage so that they do not withdraw from the joint production unit. Profit maximization of firms also implies that firms choose the capital intensity t such that the marginal revenue product of labor is equal to the total marginal cost of labor, i. Firms, not workers, choose the capital intensity of production because it is assumed that institutional conditions are such that workers appropriate capital and not vice versa. Otherwise, there should be labor shortages instead of mass unemployment. Since the appropriating factor labor is always rationed, i.e. involuntarily unemployed, the ex-ante distribution of relative bargaining power is such that the appropriated factor capital can determine factor proportions in return for its willingness to enter into new joint production units despite the appropriation threat. It is therefore in the long run costly for labor as a whole to try to appropriate an ex-ante elastic factor like capital. 20 However, this does not imply that insiders behave myopically or that the results are due to a coordination failure between firms and workers. Given the institutional shock in favor of labor, current insiders behave optimally from their point of view. They gain from aggressive wage setting because capital is elastic only in the long run, not in the short run, and, due to discounting, future wages count less than current wages. Furthermore, if one distinguished between different 20.
See Hammour (1998) and Fehn (2002) .
generations of workers, current insiders would produce a negative externality for future generations of workers. Equation (11) reveals that capital intensities depend on actual wage payments and not only on private shadow wages. Hence, there is excessive capital±labor substitution in the long-run equilibrium compared to the neoclassical benchmark in response to an appropriation push triggered by a change in the institutional set-up to the detriment of capital. Actual wage payments include a rent component due to the assumption that the institutional framework enables insiders to appropriate capital. Yet, this excessive capital±labor substitution gives rise to additional aggregate unemployment. Given this rise in aggregate unemployment, even capital intensities based on workers' shadow wages instead of actual wage payments would be too large. There would still be excessive capital±labor substitution from a social point of view because the social shadow wage of labor is zero in the presence of aggregate unemployment. Such aggregate unemployment drives a wedge between the private and the social shadow wage. However, only the social shadow wage should be relevant for determining socially optimal factor proportions.
Predictions of the model
The presented model produces a number of predictions concerning the longrun effects of an institutional shock which raises the power of labor to appropriate capital. While the putty±clay nature of technology severely restricts capital±labor substitution in the short run, the induced process of substituting capital for labor is in contrast excessively high in the long run. The long-run elasticity of substitution implied by the model is greater than one due to the appropriation problem. Capital will only get its international rate of return if it excessively excludes labor from the production process. This exclusion process has the direct consequence that unemployment will strongly and steadily rise after the appropriation push. The rise in unemployment will be much more protracted than implied by standard models of employment determination based on simple neoclassical production functions, because it will continue until the appropriation push is fully reflected in the production technology. Yet, the induced change in technology takes a long time as it happens gradually via the installation of new production units. Interestingly, the model unambiguously indicates that rising firing costs will lead to higher unemployment in the long run because the appropriation potential of insiders grows. Models which exclusively deal with the effects of higher firing costs on labor demand usually produce either an ambiguous effect or even the opposite result. See e.g. Bentilola and Bertola (1990) ; our prediction that rising firing costs lead to greater unemployment is empirically confirmed by Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) and DiTella and MacCulloch (1998) in cross-country studies.
The rise in unemployment is necessary in the model for the profit share to recover after its initial reduction in the wake of the institutional shock. A corollary of this is the endogenous reduction of bargaining power of workers because shadow wages of workers fall with lower chances of encountering a new job after possibly being laid off or leaving the firm. As the shadow wage determines the fall-back position of insiders, a period of wage stagnation or even wage reductions follows the initial wage-push period. Furthermore, lower shadow wages lead to less pressure on firms to dissolve old production units. Hence, not only are fewer new joint production units created, but the expected lifetime of production units also rises, so that the speed of creative destruction and with it productivity growth slow down. The greater expected lifetime of newly created production units is necessary to make investments profitable again despite of the appropriation problem. All this leads to a specific form of technological sclerosis which has an additional dampening effect on feasible wage growth in the long run. It is important to keep in mind in this respect that the choice of capital intensity by firms is based on the discounted value of future labor costs over the total expected lifetime of a vintage of capital that is about to be installed. In contrast, current compensation per worker averages payments for a cross-section of existing vintages of capital. Furthermore, firms must take expected future firing costs into account, which is a deadweight loss to firms and not part of the direct payments to employees. In sum, wages and labor shares can be expected to follow the hump-shaped time path after the initial appropriation push, which can be observed in Germany and France.
TESTING THE MODEL EMPIRICALLY
Two approaches are followed for empirically testing the model. First, generalized impulse-response functions to wage shocks are calculated. Wage shocks are taken to proxy institutional shocks such as a rise in firing costs that should actually be the main focus of the analysis. However, even if there existed internationally standardized time series concerning the development of institutional rigidities, they would hardly exhibit a considerable degree of variation necessary for a proper VAR analysis. Second, the long-run elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is estimated using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method. Both exercises are carried out for Germany, France, and the US.
Recently, the concept of generalized impulse response functions has been brought up. 22 Contrary to the traditional approach advocated by Sims (1980) there is no need to impose ad hoc restrictions on the covariances of the errors. Specifically, this approach does not require orthogonalization of shocks or the choice of the`right' order of the variables in the VAR as is the case for the commonly used Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix in
22.
See Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). traditional VARs. On the other hand, in contrast to the various types of structural VARs calculating generalized impulse-response functions does not require the use of more or less economically meaningful assumptions about the underlying data-generating process. Thus, a new possibility for overcoming the problem of`incredible' identifying restrictions inherent in both econometrics and time-series modeling is obtained. The general idea behind this is as follows: when calculating impulse-response functions the crucial task is to choose the composition of the hypothesized vector of shocks that hit the system at a given point in time. The common approach transforms the model so that the covariance matrix of the transformed shocks is diagonal. That way, only one variable of the transformed VAR is allowed to be shocked while the other variables are assumed to be unaffected by that shock. Another viable way would be to initially allow for all shocks to be different from zero. Generalized impulse-response functions are then defined to be conditional not on all the shocks at time t but on just the one that is of current interest. After having fixed this particular innovation from the vector of all shocks at time t the contemporaneous and future effects of the other shocks can be integrated out, i.e. averaged over time, in order to obtain the isolated effect the particular innovation on the system's variables.
23
A VAR with four variables is estimated consisting of labor share, LS, unemployment, U, nominal wages, W, and capital±labor ratio, KL. Generalized impulse responses are computed over a ten-year period. 24 The results for the impulse-response functions depicted in Figure 5 are rather mixed, though. A wage-push shock does indeed lead to a hump-shaped path for the labor share in all three countries. 25 Wages also display, as expected, a humped-shaped pattern after a wage shock in Germany and France, but not in the US where wages actually keep rising after a wage shock. Concerning the reaction of unemployment, there is only a long-run increase in unemployment in the US in reaction to a wage-push shock, whereas the unemployment rates in Germany and France appear to be very close to its initial level after about nine years. The best results are obtained for the substitution of labor by capital. A wage-push shock does indeed lead to a lasting and substantial substitution of labor by capital, and, interestingly, this result is valid most for the US. Hence, the analysis based on impulse-response functions confirms that wage shocks tend to trigger a long-run substitution process of labor by capital. Yet, the tentative character of all these results should be noted, as the common problem of low significance in impulse-response functions also arises in most of these 12 cases after a few years. This is the case whenever the bands depicting the double standard deviation of the impulse responses include the x-axis and thus the value zero. 
23.
Details on the calculation of the generalized impulse-response functions are given in the Appendix.
24.
For details on the data see the Appendix. 25.
Bentilola and Saint-Paul (1998) also find this result. 26.
The error bands were computed using Monte Carlo techniques.
Hence, a more promising avenue for empirically testing the model might be directly estimating the long-run elasticity of substitution between labor and capital '. A key prediction of the appropriation model is ' b 1, once the size of the aggregate capital stock is taken to be endogenous. Such a result would indeed be intriguing because most earlier studies reached the result that '`1, while Blanchard (1999) reads the empirical evidence such that this value is very close to one. 27 Yet, for most of these earlier studies two important remarks are in order. First, a number of earlier studies estimate long-run elasticities of substitution between capital and labor without explicitly allowing the size of the aggregate capital stock to vary, e.g. they often estimate a wage-gap type of equation. Neglecting capital adjustment can produce serious distortions concerning the estimations. 28 Second, most studies do not take advantage of recent econometric techniques explicitly taking into account the stochastic trends embodied in the relevant variables 27 .
For a survey of such studies, see Rowthorn (1996) . 28.
However, the importance to allow for the capital stock to vary is well known; see e.g. Nadiri (1968, 1970) . allowing for long-run cointegration analysis. They either neglect the stochastic trends or use variables in first differences so no results of the long-run relationships between the variables of interest can be obtained. But it is exactly such a long-run relationship, namely between factor prices and intensities, that this paper focuses on. It should therefore not be surprising that our approach reaches quite different results. Differentiating our production function (1) with respect to k and n yields
Firms are assumed to set real labor and capital compensation equal to their respective marginal products. Recalling that At A0e 1t and taking natural logarithms the following equations are obtained: log w p À 1 11 log n y 12 t 13a with À 1 log1 À ' À 1a'log z À log A0 and log uc À 2 21 log k y 13b with À 2 log ' À 1a'log z
The real wage is denoted by wap and uc t denotes the real user costs of capital. 29 The coefficients correspond to the parameters of the production function in the following way: 11 21 À1a' and 12 1' À 1a'
Since the integration tests shown in the Appendix indicate that all relevant variables are integrated of order 1 and that there exists a cointegrating relationship between wap t and nay t as well as between uc t and kay t , the adoption of an error-correction model is appropriate for estimating the long-
29.
For a detailed data description, see the Appendix. and Á log uc t 2 log uc tÀ1 À 2 log k y
with 1 2 À1a', i.e. the long-run elasticity of substitution. 32 One possible approach to estimating the above equations is the two-step procedure proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) . However, the estimates of the cointegrating relation in the first step rely on their super-consistency property when used with I(1) variables. As is well known, these estimates may have substantial finite-sample biases. 33 Regarding the rather small degrees of freedom usually available in such analyses this could be a serious problem. Estimating the error-correction model directly usually results in less biased estimates with small samples.
34
The standard error of the long-run estimate can in principle be computed by applying non-linear least squares or by calculating the linear combination of the standard errors of both coefficients involved in the long-run relation obtained by OLS. However, there is a simpler way for achieving this goal. In a reparameterization of the ECM combined with instrumental variable estimation the standard error is readily available. 35 The appropriate Bewley transformation of the labor and capital equation would then be 30 .
See Engle and Granger (1987) . 31.
Labor-saving technical progress is omitted to maintain clarity of presentation. It is of course included in actual estimations. 32.
The results are robust to alternative specifications, e.g. with n as endogenous variable. This is not surprising since the focus is entirely on the long-run relationships which are invariant to differing formulations.
33.
See Banerjee et al. (1993, Ch. 7) . 34.
See Johnston and DiNardo (1997, p. 264 ).
35.
See Bewley (1979) . Clearly, the regressors Á logwap t and Á log uc t are contemporaneously correlated with the respective dependent variables, so the use of instrumental variable estimation is required. Choosing logwap tÀ1 and log uc tÀ1 as instruments produces exactly the same numerical result as the ECM. 36 Since both formulations stem from the production function of the representative firm, it is very likely that the errors of the two equations are not uncorrelated, so they are actually seemingly unrelated regressions. Hence, the SUR method is appropriate for estimating the long-run elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
For all three countries the data period for the estimation comprises semiannual data from 1970 to 1995. 37 The estimation results for Germany are shown in Table 1 . The time coefficient estimating the effect of proxied labor augmenting technical progress was insignificant at any conventional significance level, so it has been dropped out of the final regression. The unrestricted SUR produces significant values for both 1 and 2 . Column two of Table 1 reveals that the coefficients are also significantly greater than À1 although for 2 only at the 5% level. From these coefficients the long-run elasticity of substitution can be computed as 1.431 and 1.727, respectively. In turn, both values are significantly greater than unity. Of course, economic theory demands that these two values are equal, so a restricted SUR is additionally estimated. The result can be seen in the lower half of Table 1. Marginally at the 5% level and clearly at the 1% level the restriction that 1 2 cannot be rejected. Via a highly significant -value of À0.691 a longrun elasticity of substitution of 1.447 is obtained.
38
The French case, which is given in Table 2 , is somewhat more pronounced than the German case due to the high value of 2.192 for ' in the labor equation. On the other hand, the value of 1.43 in the capital equation is smaller than in Germany. Both estimates are highly significant. The restriction that the two computed elasticities are the same, must be rejected at the 5% level but cannot be rejected at the 1% level. Again, the coefficient for time was not significant and it was therefore omitted from the regression.
36.
See Wickens and Breusch (1988) . 37.
See the Appendix for a detailed description of the data. 38.
The short-run (first-differenced) variables were selected using a stepwise procedure complying with the FPE criterion. They are not shown here for clarity of exposition.
Looking at the US case in Table 3 , a markedly different picture is revealed. First of all, the coefficient for technical progress is significant even at the 1% level. The estimates of are much larger than in the other two countries resulting in values for ' of 1.112 and 1.181. Consequently, although they are still significantly different from zero, it cannot be rejected at any conventional level that the long-run elasticity of substitution equals unity. Therefore, a Cobb± Douglas framework for describing the US production structure seems to be appropriate. This should not be too much of a surprise recalling the relatively stable ratio between wages and the marginal product of labor depicted in Figure  3 . The result holds for the restricted SUR as well. It cannot be rejected that the imposed restriction does in fact hold yielding an elasticity of 1.147.
In sum, the estimated values of ' for Germany, France, and the US are all significantly different from zero. Whereas the results for the US point to a more Cobb±Douglas-like production structure, the two continental European countries exhibit long-run elasticities of substitution which are substantially and significantly greater than one. Hence, these results indicate that the appropriation model is empirically relevant for both countries, Germany and France, in deriving greater harmful effects of institutional shocks on employment than is usually assumed. The neoclassical benchmark case is usually regarded as an upper bound for the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital even in the long run. Our results suggest that the substitution process is not only more protracted but it is also stronger leading to greater negative long-run consequences for employment. Our result for the aggregate level is reinforced once workers are distinguished according to qualifications. Krusell et al. (1997) have shown that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is much higher for low-qualified workers than for highly qualified workers, who can be viewed to a larger extent as being complementary to capital. Using US data, their estimated value for the elasticity of substitution between less skilled workers and capital is 1.67, while the one between skilled labor and capital is only 0.67. Machines tend to make low-qualified workers superfluous, but they usually require a staff qualified enough to handle the capital stock in place. Thus, increasing firing costs and raising in particular wages at the lower end of the wage spectrum, which is often praised as being an especially`fair' wage policy, are particularly harmful from the long-run employment perspective. Large rises in the unemployment rates at the lower end of the qualification spectrum are to be expected as a result over time. Moreover, it is very difficult to reverse such a process of substitution of labor by capital once firms have invested in less labor-intensive production techniques. Firms in labor-intensive sectors may then have already moved production to countries where labor is cheaper, and the remaining firms may have already borne significant sunk costs in order to raise their capital intensity of production. A lot of patience by policy-makers as well as by wagesetters is therefore required if such a process of marked rises in labor costs, an ongoing substitution between capital and labor, and strongly rising unemployment is to be stopped or even reversed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The vast literature on unemployment has mostly focused on labor market issues, such as the institutional set-up of wage bargaining and welfare benefits. In contrast, the impact of capital formation and of the incentives to install new firms have often been neglected. This is the case because job creation is often thought to be a matter of encouraging more employment on a given capital stock thus facing a permanent tradeoff between employment growth and higher real wages. This paper takes a different approach by explicitly dealing with the long-run consequences on labor demand and employment of institutional shocks. It is theoretically as well as empirically shown that this tradeoff between employment growth and higher real wages measured in efficiency units disappears in the long run. In line with the theoretical results of the appropriation model, the estimated values for the long-run elasticities of substitution between capital and labor for Germany and France are significantly and substantially greater than one.
Hence, appropriation shocks have greater negative repercussions on employment than implied by Cobb±Douglas production functions and improvements in the functioning of labor markets may raise employment and real wages in the long run. Institutional differences can therefore at least partially account for rising unemployment in continental Europe in combination with a humped-shaped path of the labor share. As is well known, this development is in stark contrast to the US, where the labor share has remained roughly constant and where the unemployment rate is at its lowest point in the last 30 years. It is also very well compatible with the fact that the employment performance has deteriorated most since the early 1970s in those OECD countries which have experienced the greatest decline in their investment rate. 39 The institutional environment, especially in Germany and France, since that time is such that capital has a relatively small incentive to enter into new joint production units, thus explaining the lackluster investment performance, and such that capital wants to exclude labor from the production process, resulting in an excessively high capital±labor ratio considering the size of the unemployment problem.
The much discussed process of globalization appears to be closely related to these results. Globalization not only raises the potential for specialization, but it also broadens the technological menu which is available to firms by facilitating international technology transfers. Both factors enhance the scope for substituting labor by capital. Globalization may therefore lead to higher overall investments and growth, but countries with a badly functioning labor market may be largely excluded from reaping the fruits of globalization. Especially the less qualified workers in these countries face trouble concerning their employment prospects and earning possibilities. Labor market reforms must therefore remain high up on the agenda for economic policy in continental European countries such as Germany and France. It is often asserted that it is politically close to impossible to actually implement the necessary employment-enhancing labor market reforms. However, the results of the present paper imply that this political infeasibility is not a natural constant but rather the outcome of policy-makers basing their decisions on a too short time horizon.
APPENDIX
A.1. Generalized impulse-response functions
Consider the VAR in standard form
39. See Rowthorn (1996) . where x t is an m Â 1 vector of endogenous variables, w t is a q Â 1 vector of deterministic and/or exogenous variables, and 4 t is a vector of shocks with E4 t 0, E4 t e H t AE for all t, where AE f' ij Y iY j 1Y 2Y F F F Y mg. Focusing on the impulse responses a reformulation of the VAR in terms of the MA representation is useful:
The purpose of an impulse-response analysis is to measure the time profile of the effect of shocks at a given point in time on the expected future value of variables in a dynamic system. Usually the researcher is interested in tracing the effect of a shock to one specific variable on itself and all other variables in the system. Since, in general, all elements of the e t vector are correlated, it would be misleading just to set one element, say e jt , to a certain value and all other elements to zero. Hence, the main problem with impulse-response analysis is to choose the appropriate vector of hypothesized shocks, d. The traditional approach 41 is to use the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix R, implying
where P is an m Â m lower triangular matrix resulting in the MA representation .4) such that n t P À1 e t are orthogonalized, i.e. En i n t H I m . Having constructed the shocks in such a way the impulse responses may easily be obtained. The m Â 1 vector of orthogonalized impulse-response functions of a unit shock to the jth equation on x tn is given by 2 0 j n A n Pe j n 0Y 1Y 2Y F F F (A.5) where e j is an m Â 1 selection vector with unity as its jth element and zeros elsewhere. The problems with this approach are well known. There is no unique P that satisfies (A.3). The Cholesky decomposition is not the only way to compute P and, once having resorted to using the decomposition, the ordering of the equations in the VAR system affects the implicit restrictions imposed by the decomposition. In fact, the Cholesky decomposition imposes a recursive structure on the VAR model, meaning that the variable x st in the x t vector 40.
The matrices A i and G i are obtained from È i and É i using recursive formulae. See e.g. Lu È tkepohl (1993, p. 18 ).
41.
See Sims (1980) . cannot have an instantaneous impact on variables x kt for k`s. That specific structure of restrictions is rarely justified on economic reasoning. One way to circumvent this issue is to think of economically meaningful restrictions that are sufficient to identify a set of independent shocks. This approach is taken in the so-called structural VAR models. 42 Another way is to use generalized impulse-response functions. Instead of shocking all the elements of 4 t , one can consider fixing the jth shock from the vector of all shocks and then integrating out the effects of other shocks using an assumed or historically observed distribution of the errors. 43 In this case we have GI x nY j Y tÀ1 Ex tn j4 jt j Y tÀ1 À Ex tn j tÀ1 (A.6)
The difference on the RHS means that one is taking the expectation conditional on the observed history tÀ1 and on the fixed value of the jth shock at time t while integrating out all other contemporaneous and future shocks. Subtracting from this, the expectation conditional only on the history produces the sole effect of the fixed shock which is called the generalized impulseresponse function.
Assuming that e t has a multivariate normal distribution the conditional expectation becomes
The unscaled generalized impulse-response function of a shock to the jth equation at time t on x tn is then given by
Normalizing the size of a shock to one standard deviation, i.e. setting j ' jj p , the scaled generalized impulse-response function is finally given by A.9) This scaled generalized impulse-response function measures the effect of one standard error shock to the jth equation at time t on expected values of x at time t n. Note that this generalized impulse-response function only reduces to the traditional one generated by the Cholesky decomposition if the covariance matrix of the errors is diagonal, i.e. if the variables are uncorrelated.
42. See e.g. Enders (1995, pp. 320±338) or Giannini (1992) for an overview of structural VAR modeling.
43.
See Pesaran and Shin (1998).
A.2. Data sources
All the data were taken from the OECD Statistical Compendium. For sources and detailed definitions see OECD (1998) . The data for the generalized impulseresponse analysis range from 1970 to 1995 with semi-annual frequency. LS is the labor share in the business sector, U refers to the standardized unemployment rates, W refers to the nominal wage rate computed as the compensation per employee in the private sector, whereas KL corresponds to the capital±labor ratio in the business sector. The data for the SUR estimation of the elasticity of substitution range from 1970 to 1995 with semi-annual frequency as well. To compute real wages, denoted by wap, the deflator for GDP, p, was used. Private employment, n, was constructed using the difference of total dependent employees and employment by the government. The GDP is denoted by y. The price for capital is proxied by the user costs of capital constructed by uc t p I t i L t d À p I t ap t , with p I the deflator for investment goods and i L the longterm interest rate. Finally, the capital stock is denoted by k. Unit root tests were carried out using the augmented Dickey±Fuller procedure. The cointegration tests have been conducted using the t-statistic of the adjustment parameter of the error-correction term. 44 The results are shown in Table A .1. 
